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ETOs [extraterritorial human rights obligations in the field of socio-economic rights] are 
a missing link: Without ETOs, human rights could not assume their proper role as the 
legal bases for regulating globalization. With ETOs, an enabling environment for ESCRs 
can be generated, the primacy of human rights can be implemented, climate change and 
eco-destruction can be stopped, the dominance of big money broken, TNCs regulated, 
and IGOs made accountable.1 
 
I. Introduction 
What is the value of ideas of international human rights in the struggle against global poverty and 
economic inequality? This question is not new, but recently a new aspect to it has emerged: what 
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contribution might international human rights law make, on the basis of an “extraterritorial” 
orientation, as far as state obligations are concerned? Such an enquiry has been foregrounded by a 
major international initiative by experts and activists: the 2011 Maastricht Principles on the 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
the ‘Principles’).2 The present chapter offers a critical evaluation of this enquiry, using the Principles 
                                                          
2 MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS (adopted Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/maastricht-eto-principles-uk_web.pdf 
[hereinafter Principles]. The official commentary to the Principles is Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 
HUM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012). For other academic writing on the Principles, see CASES AND CONCEPTS ON 
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Fons Coomans & Rolf 
Künnemann eds., 2012); GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013); Olivier De Schutter, 
Foreword, in CASES AND CONCEPTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
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Langford et al., Introduction: An Emerging Field, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES, supra, at 3; Mark Gibney, On 
Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES, supra, at 32; Malcolm Langford & Mac 
Darrow, Moral Theory, International Law and Global Justice, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES, supra, at 419; Wouter 
Vandenhole, Beyond Territoriality: The Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 429 (2011); Margot E. Salomon & Ian Seiderman, Human Rights 
Norms for a Globalized World: The Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 GLOBAL POL'Y 458 (2012) ; Wouter Vandenhole, Emerging Normative 
Frameworks on Transnational Obligations, (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working 
Paper no. 2012/17, 2012), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/21874; Margot E. Salomon, The Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Overview of Positive “Obligations 
to Fulfil”, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-maastricht-principles-on-extraterritorial-obligations-
of-states-in-the-area-of-economic-social-and-cultural-rights-and-its-commentary-an-overview-of-positive-obligations-
to-fulfil/; Fons Coomans, Situating the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Apr. 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256836. 
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and its associated Commentary as a case study. This case study is used because on the fundamental 
bases for obligation—conceptions of ‘power’ and ‘cooperation’ that will be reviewed herein—the 
Principles and the Commentary reflect how many international legal experts, not only those 
associated with the Principles, view the general contours of the law in this area. The documents thus 
offer a certain way to make the case for invoking international human rights law as a means of 
combating global poverty and economic inequality.  In engaging this critical appraisal, I adopt the 
method of ‘immanent critique,’ assessing the merits of the substance of the legal requirements 
according to the claims made about the law by the proponents of it, such as the claim made by the 
ETO Consortium in the extract above. I do this because such claims reflect how many in the field of 
international public policy view the value of the legal framework, and also the messages about this, 
like the above claim, which are being impressed upon those NGOs working in the field of 
international economic justice.  
II. Extraterritoriality of Socioeconomic Rights: Meaning and Historical Context 
The ‘extraterritorial’ dimension of state obligations in international human rights law concerns the 
question of norms addressing the relationship between people located in one part of the world and 
people located in other parts of the world, when these differences are conceived in terms of territorial 
title in international law. The ‘extraterritorial’ approach classifies people and their rights, and states 
and their obligations, according to the legal status of the territory within which the people reside and 
the nature of the connection between that status and the legal identity of the state concerned. Human 
rights are ‘territorial’ when opposable to the state in whose territory the individuals reside. They are 
‘extraterritorial’ when opposable to a foreign state lacking sovereignty-as-title over the territory 
where the individuals reside. 
Seeking to address global poverty and economic inequality through this approach involves 
challenging an exclusively ‘territorial’ conception of state obligations in human rights law, to include 
also ‘extraterritorial’ obligations, especially where the territorial and the extraterritorial distinction 
maps on to, respectively, places in the world where people are relatively economically advantaged, 
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and places in the world where people are relatively economically disadvantaged. In other words, put 
more crudely, to make economically advantaged states obliged to address the economic position not 
only of people within their territory, but also of poor people extraterritorially. 
International law has for some time been a site of efforts to challenge global poverty and economic 
inequality, notably in the period during the main wave of post-World War II decolonization, when 
newly independent, former colonial and relatively economically disadvantaged states sought to 
promote a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO).  This period saw the promotion of a ‘right 
to development’ which would oblige economically advantaged states to enable, including through 
resource and technology transfer, economic development in economically disadvantaged states. Such 
efforts were hampered by general resistance by wealthier states, with articulation and codification 
efforts residing largely in General Assembly resolutions at the UN, vulnerable to the challenge that 
such ‘soft law’ is insufficient by itself, absent the necessary developments in treaty and/or customary 
law, to be normative. 
By contrast, international human rights law, which was also being established at this time, met 
the standard test for normativity, being articulated not only in the UN General Assembly’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but also in a range of treaties and other instruments. Although 
many of these instruments address economic rights and contain provisions that speak to issues of 
international economic justice, the main focus of attention with respect to understandings and 
interpretations of all human rights instruments began as territorial, being concerned predominantly 
with the relationship between individuals and the state within which they are located.3  
Internationally, efforts to promote international economic justice were dominated by initiatives 
outside international human rights treaty-based mechanisms, building on the earlier NIEO-focus in 
the UN political organs. The Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), became the leading multilateral bodies concerned with 
‘development,’ cohabiting with sui generis political initiatives such as the 0.7% of GDP target for the 
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provision of development assistance (which came out of the ‘right to development’ initiatives), 
campaigns for debt relief and the elimination of tariffs and subsidies, and the ‘Millennium 
Development Goals’ (MDGs) and successor ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (SDGs). The World 
Bank, the IMF and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) became sites of resistance for social 
movements seeking different, more radical and transformatory approaches to global poverty and 
economic inequality. 
Later in the lifespan of post-World War II international human rights law, however, it is possible 
to identify greater receptiveness to addressing extraterritorial situations when human rights treaties 
are discussed, interpreted and applied by expert bodies, courts and tribunals, states, NGOs and 
independent experts. The earliest and most prominent trend in this regard is contained in the 
jurisprudence relating to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (notably in decisions 
about the Turkish presence in Northern Cyprus), and in subsequent decisions relating to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other regional and global human 
rights instruments. This development was heightened by a greater critical focus in the international 
public consciousness with respect to the impact on human rights of U.S.-led extraterritorial activities 
associated with/occurring during and continuing after the ‘War on Terror.’ Courts and expert bodies 
being called upon by petitioners to bring these activities within the regulation of human rights treaties 
have considered this through the aforementioned device of ‘extraterritoriality’: conceiving the spatial 
reach of human rights obligations as being either ‘territorial’ or ‘extraterritorial,’ and setting out tests 
for when the latter form of obligations would be triggered.4 
 
The push towards the affirmation and delineation of extraterritorial human rights treaty 
obligations can be seen perhaps to have been most prominent and developed in the field of civil and 
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political rights when this set of rights is compared with economic, social and cultural rights. The 
relative difference can be explained in part due to the aforementioned prominence given to certain 
concerns relating to rights in the former category in the period after the attacks on the U.S. on 9/11, 
both territorial and extraterritorial. Equally, it is partly explicable because of the greater opportunity 
for and significance of international expert review regarding civil and political rights resulting from 
the more long-standing existence and state acceptance of jurisdiction of bodies engaged in such 
review exclusively, notably the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the UN 
Human Rights Committee. Also, of the only three bodies that operate as courts and issue binding 
judgments with respect to complaints, the two applying instruments that cover economic, social and 
cultural rights – the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court of Human and 
People’s Rights – have had less opportunity to contribute to case law compared to the European Court 
of Human Rights; and although the International Court of Justice, as part of its general move into 
human rights law, has made important pronouncements on the extraterritorial application of human 
rights law, including certain instruments covering economic, social and cultural rights, this has 
happened only recently, and in only a few instances, with significance more in the arena of norm-
clarification than norm-enforcement.5 
Whatever the cause, it is clear that when the extraterritorial application of human rights law has 
been addressed, whether before international interpretation bodies as in the jurisprudence mentioned 
above, or in popular discourse, or in academic literature, there had been until relatively recently a 
tendency for civil and political rights to be given greater and sometimes even exclusive focus when 
compared with economic, social and cultural rights. Writing in 2007, Alan Boyle and Christine 
Chinkin observed that “despite human rights reports setting out the adverse impact of neo-liberal 
economic ideology and globalization on the human rights of the poor, of women and of other 
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vulnerable peoples, there has been little real attempt to address these issues within the framework of 
international law.”6 
III. The ETO Project – An Introduction 
There is now an effort to alter the balance of the agenda of extraterritoriality within international 
human rights law in favor of economic, social and cultural rights, building on important but sparse 
developments in this field, from certain statements made by international expert bodies and important 
early academic interventions. This is being spearheaded by a group of experts and activists, including 
members of international human rights expert bodies, NGO staffers and university professors. They 
are backed up by a broader expert/activist network including many NGOs working in the field of 
human rights generally and rights in the area of international economic justice and equality in 
particular, called the Extraterritorial Obligations Consortium, or ETO Consortium for short, the 
source of the quotation at the beginning of this chapter.7 
 
In 2011, forty members of this movement adopted the Maastricht Principles on the Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘Principles.’8 This was followed a year later by a detailed and lengthy legal Commentary by the 
six members of the drafting committee of the Principles, issued as an authoritative explanation for 
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what was meant in each of the Principles.9 Backed up by this Commentary, the Principles attempt to 
codify comprehensively in a series of treaty-like provisions the main contours of an international 
human rights law regime with respect to the actors and subject-matter in its title.  
The present chapter draws selectively from these documents and the legal norms they set out, 
focusing on the fundamental bases for extraterritorial obligations relating to economic rights in 
international human rights law: what will be described below as conceptions of ‘power’ and 
‘cooperation.’ These fundamental bases for obligation are the key features of the legal regime as far 
as the potential it has to promote international economic inequality and combat global poverty. The 
following analysis sets out what the Principles and the Commentary say about these bases for 
obligation, because, as mentioned earlier, in this respect the documents reflect a widely shared 
approach to invoking international human rights to address global poverty, and so can form the basis 
for a critical appraisal of the substantive merits of these areas of obligation. 
There is now a global campaign, spearheaded by the ETO Consortium, to have the Maastricht 
Principles and more broadly international human rights law placed at the center of global activism on 
ending global poverty and economic inequality. This campaign is based on the proposition, as 
reflected in the quotation at the start of this chapter by the ETO Consortium, that international human 
rights law has a primary, perhaps even preeminent, positive role in combating global poverty and 
economic inequality and regulating economic globalization. Thus the law is invoked to intervene in 
a highly contested area of public policy, where a broad range of very different preferences could be 
adopted and promoted, and/or avoided and ignored, and/or undermined, through and by it. It is 
important, then, to ask: which polices are given preference over the alternatives by international 
human rights law as it is understood by the leading experts? What is possible, what is prevented, what 
is included, what is excluded, in the wide range of ways that might exist to order the world so as to 
better combat global poverty and economic inequality? What follows addresses this question by 
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considering some of the main features of the substantive policy framework enshrined in the 
fundamental areas of legal obligation, using the Principles and the Commentary as a resource on how 
these areas of legal obligation are understood by the leading experts. 
Before engaging in a detailed appraisal of the substantive merits of the policy preferences 
embedded in the main contours of the legal regime, it is necessary, in the present section, to set out, 
by way of shorthand description, the general conceptions of areas of obligation in the legal regime, 
and to introduce the key questions of policy that need to be asked when appraising the substantive 
value of this legal framework.  
International human rights law obligations in the field of socioeconomic rights are triggered in 
two main circumstances. These two triggers are summarized in Principle 8 of the Maastricht 
Principles thus: 
a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, 
that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory; and 
b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations 
and human rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through international 
cooperation, to realize human rights universally.10 
The obligations described in paragraph (a) conceptualize a trigger for the operation of legal 
regulation if and when a particular type of power relationship operates between a state and people 
outside its territory. Only if this power relationship is present are the obligations triggered. According 
to this approach, the very existence of obligations operates on the basis of a default position of 
exclusively territorial significance (in terms of the location of the rights-holders) which is departed 
from if a particular power relationship is considered to exist extraterritorially. In what follows the 
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notion of a ‘power’ conception of extraterritorial obligations will be used as shorthand for this feature 
of the normative framework. 
The obligations described in paragraph (b) arise not only as a consequence of the existence of a 
power relationship extraterritorially but, rather, in any event. They are concerned not with regulating 
exceptional power relationships if and when they arise, but, rather, with addressing the ‘normal’ 
situation of economic interdependence between states understood as a permanent state of affairs, 
seeking to graft onto this certain requirements on the part of states in a position to do so to improve 
economic rights outside their territories, described as being about ‘cooperation.’ Thus there is no 
trigger that needs to be present in order for the obligations to be in operation; they operate all the 
time. In what follows, the notion of obligations concerned with ‘cooperation’ will be used as 
shorthand for this feature of the normative framework. 
IV. What Is at Stake? 
Clearly there are many and varied ways in which the structures of the global economy and 
international economic relations could be changed in order to combat poverty and economic 
inequality, and a range of different rationales for these changes. The choice between these options is 
contested, implicating different conceptions of economic and political theory, and historical record, 
involving varying degrees of difference, from modest reform to radical transformation of the status 
quo, and a matter on which a wide range of stakeholders, from grassroots civil society activists to the 
elites of the international economic system, are and will be engaged. Bearing all of this in mind, how 
might what international human rights law is said to offer implicate these broader debates? Whose 
agenda does it further, and whose does it undermine?  
The point of this enquiry is not to adopt a particular substantive approach to, and/or the interests 
of a particular stakeholder about, how the global economy might be ordered better. Rather, it is to ask 
how the law might mediate the choices made about, and the fortunes of particular stakeholders in 
relation to, these contests, bearing in mind the particular policy preferences embedded in legal norms. 
Whereas it is for broader debates and processes to contest and determine the merit of these 
11 
 
preferences, it is important to know what they are, so as to know what particular agenda is being 
furthered by advocacy of the law in this field. 
In the ensuing analysis, the following considerations will be borne in mind. In the first place, in a 
situation of complex economic independence, a multitude of different causal and power relationships 
and linkages operate in all sorts of ways and at all sorts of levels to determine the economic position 
of most people in the world. Economies are intertwined, and operate on the basis of many varied and 
dynamic power and control hierarchies. How does international human rights law understand and 
seek to mediate these relationships? In the second place, how does the way the law is conceived relate 
to rationales that underpin options for realizing international economic equality and the range of 
possible options themselves? The following two sections analyze the potential and the limitations of 
the two key features of the substantive legal regime. 
V. Ground One: Power – Description and Critique 
It will be recalled that the ‘power’ basis for extraterritorial human rights obligations is concerned 
with defining a set of circumstances extraterritorially (sometimes with a territorial origin) that have 
to be met before, obligations are triggered. These circumstances are conceived in Maastricht Principle 
8 thus: “the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, that have effects on the 
enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory.”11 
A plain reading of this provision suggests an idea that is potentially very broad in what it takes in 
by way of economic interdependence, because of the inclusion of omissions as well as acts: the idea 
of all “effects,” defined simply as such, as a basis for obligation, and how it covers acts and omissions 
existing not only extraterritorially but also territorially. However, this expansive potential is lessened 
considerably by Maastricht Principle 9, which states that  
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A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights 
in any of the following: 
a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control…; 
b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; 
c) situations in which the State…is in a position to exercise decisive influence … to 
realize economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.12 
Also relevant is Maastricht Principle 13, which states that 
States must desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially. The responsibility 
of States is engaged where such nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of their 
conduct.13 
The import of these provisions is to set up a more qualified and varied approach to conceiving 
power so as to trigger obligations relating to the enjoyment of human rights extraterritorially.  
On the one hand, if the state is present on the ground extraterritorially, exercising “authority or 
effective control,” then it has a broad obligation to “respect, protect and fulfil” economic, social and 
cultural rights there (Maastricht Principle 9a). This retains the breadth of the original articulation in 
Maastricht Principle 8, but is limited to unusual situations where states are present in this kind of 
direct way outside their territories. It reflects how the ICCPR and the ECHR have been understood 
to apply extraterritorially, via a definition of the term “jurisdiction” in these treaties to include the 
exercise of effective control extraterritorially.14 Similarly, the term “jurisdiction” (which is used in 
the heading for Maastricht Principle 9) was invoked by the International Court of Justice, without 
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14 On this, see, for example, Wilde, supra note 4, at 641-44. 
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supporting authority, as an extraterritorial trigger based on the exercise of effective territorial control 
for the obligations in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
even though the term is not used in that treaty.15 
On the other hand, the more commonplace projection of power extraterritorially that falls short of 
direct extraterritorial presence is covered only if, on the one hand, states are in a position to exercise 
“decisive influence” to “realize” economic, social and cultural rights (Maastricht Principle 9c), or, on 
the other hand, in the context of “acts and omissions” that have “foreseeable effects on the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights” (Maastricht Principle 9b), or if it is “foreseeable” that they 
create a “real risk of nullifying or impairing” such enjoyment (Maastricht Principle 13). 
We see, then, that the human rights law regulation of all forms of economic interaction other than 
the narrow circumstances of direct extraterritorial presence on the ground is conventionally 
understood to be either limited to a high threshold of “direct influence,” or, otherwise, is concerned 
with power relationships that are in some way deemed to be harmful (cf. “nullifying or impairing”). 
The suggestion that this is about harm is supported in the Commentary to the Maastricht Principles, 
which explains the general distinction between the ‘power’ and ‘cooperation’ bases for obligations 
in Maastricht Principle 8 paragraphs a) and b), the former being the present focus of attention, thus:  
… the obligation to provide assistance to other states in order to strengthen respect for 
human rights in those states, in the absence of any particular link between a state and the 
denial of human rights in those states, arises only by virtue of the obligation of a global 
character as described in Principle 8 (b).16 
Here, then, is the idea that the ‘power’ conception for obligations can be understood holistically 
as being about a “particular link between a state and the denial of human rights.” Furthermore, the 
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I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 112 (July 9). 
16 De Schutter et al., supra note 2, at 1101-02. 
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language suggests that of the two types of extraterritorial obligations, only ‘power’ is concerned with 
responsibility arising out of harm; ‘cooperation’ (in Maastricht Principle 8(b)) is described in 
language suggesting a different rationale and objective (the word ‘cooperation’ itself, and the way 
the substantive action required of a state here is to “provide assistance” – is hardly the language of 
reparation for harm).  
The language used also suggests that the nature of harm is to be limited from the full extent of 
possible options available – only a “particular link” which has to be foreseeable and involving a “real 
risk.” The relatively limited definition of causation is underscored by the Commentary, which states 
that  
Principle 9 (b) acknowledges that the obligations of a state under international human 
rights law may effectively be triggered when its responsible authorities know or should 
have known the conduct of the state will bring about substantial human rights effects in 
another territory. Because this element of foreseeability must be present, a state will not 
necessarily be held liable for all the consequences that result from its conduct where the 
proximity between that conduct and the consequences is remote.17 
In the same way, the Commentary to Maastricht Principle 13 states that “[f]oreseeability serves 
an important limiting function by ensuring that a state shall not be surprised with claims of 
responsibility for unforeseeable risks that are only remotely connected to its conduct.”18 
Clearly discussion and disagreement can be had about, and work in related areas of law such as 
the law of state responsibility drawn upon in considering, how these key terms can and should be 
defined legally, from the notion of ‘particular’ types of harm that are ‘proximate’ and ‘foreseeable’ 
and not ‘remote’ to the idea of a ‘real risk’ with effects that are ‘substantial.’ But whichever approach 
is taken in the range of options for the scope of liability here, from narrow to broad, more 
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fundamentally the range itself only covers a subset of the wide linkages that exist globally between 
national economies, given how they are intertwined in an acute, complex and constant fashion. This 
is a limited notion of international economic relations in not taking in the full potential for causal 
relationships that can mediate the state of economic rights.  
 
VI. Ground Two: Cooperation and Assistance– Description and Critique 
 
[G]overnments may feel bound to act, but that feeling of obligation may simply come 
from their own sense of altruism rather than a belief that human rights bind all 
governments to help if the government most directly responsible fails to fulfil its duties.19 
 
The second area of obligations, those relating to ‘cooperation’ in the realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights extraterritorially, would suggest that the idea of “help” is, indeed, derived not 
simply from altruism but also legal obligation. But what is the scope of this help and, indeed, what 
does conceiving it as help and associating it with the idea of “altruism” indicate about its nature and 
potential?  
As previously indicated, the ‘cooperation’ obligations are not conceived to be triggered by the 
existence of a particular power relationship between a state and an extraterritorial human rights 
situation. Rather, they operate generally. As such, they have the potential to be of much wider 
relevance to international economic relations, and so to be much more important to efforts to combat 
global poverty and economic inequality, than the first set of obligations. 
It will be recalled that Maastricht Principle 8 defines the ‘cooperation’ category of extraterritorial 
obligations as being “of a global character… to take action, separately, and jointly through 
                                                          
19  Andrew Heard, Human Rights: Chimeras in Sheep’s Clothing? (unpublished manuscript) (1997), 
http://www.sfu.ca/~aheard/intro.html, cited in Langford et al., supra note 2, at 8. 
16 
 
international cooperation, to realize human rights universally.”20 The main human rights instrument 
enshrining the obligation to cooperate in this way is the ICESCR, in Article 2.21 Drawing on this, 
Maastricht Principle 9 states that 
A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural rights 
in … c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its 
executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in a position … to take measures to realize 
economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.22 
This law on ‘cooperation’ includes, arguably as its most important norm, and falling within the 
particular obligation to “fulfil” in this area, an obligation “to provide assistance,” as reflected in 
Maastricht Principle 33. 23  The obligation to provide assistance to enable the realization of 
socioeconomic rights extraterritorially is the only area of this legal regime that speaks to the 
fundamental issue of financial, technological and resource transfer across borders from the 
economically privileged to the economically disadvantaged in order to combat poverty and reduce 
economic inequality, not simply, as in the ‘power’ area of law, to make amends for certain forms of 
foreseeable and non-historical harm. It is the area within which the ‘right to development,’ economic 
redistribution, and development assistance and aid, including the setting of targets for such aid, must 
fit, if they fit at all, as far as the contours of international human rights law are concerned. 
The Maastricht Principles Commentary also invokes the duty to provide assistance. It asserts that 
“[d]espite its provision in binding international instruments, disagreement persists as to the legally 
binding nature of the obligation of international cooperation as expressed in” the ICESCR.24 This is 
                                                          
20 Principles, supra note 2, princ. 8. 
21 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
22 Principles, supra note 2, princ. 9. 
23 Id. princ. 33. 
24 De Schutter et al., supra note 2, at 1094. 
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a significant observation when situated within the law of human rights extraterritorially, and, more 
broadly, within international human rights law in particular and international law as a whole. 
Actually, disagreement exists across the board in many areas of international law, and, notably, in 
relation to many aspects of the law of the extraterritorial application of human rights. However, this 
is the only rule on extraterritoriality where the 86-page Commentary invokes the existence of 
“disagreement.”25 Given the wider context of disagreement in international law, one has to ask why 
a particular rule is singled out as the only one in relation to which disagreement exists, especially 
when, as the statement acknowledges, the rule is expressly articulated in a treaty. Moreover, this 
approach is in marked contrast to the way, as mentioned above, the Principles seem to adopt the 
“jurisdiction” basis for triggering obligations in this sphere, and the effective control basis on which 
that term has been defined in case law, as operative in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, 
even though the term is not contained in the ICESCR and the case law defining it in this way is 
derived, as mentioned above (the  dictum from the ICJ), from the other human rights treaties that do 
use it and are limited to civil and political rights. 
The transposition of the standard from the law on civil and political rights is also significant in 
two further respects. In the first place, actually, even in that area of law extraterritorial applicability 
is disputed; there is “disagreement.”26 In the second place, the area of applicability that the standard 
is being transposed to – economic rights in situations where control and authority is exercised ‘on the 
ground’ extraterritorially – addresses activities by states which are, as mentioned, although significant 
when they happen, unusual when situated within the broader projection of power by states 
extraterritorially and the effects of this on the economic position of people worldwide. Given the 
limited conception of the ‘power’ test for applicability, as reviewed above, much of the broader 
picture is only going to be addressed by the law through the alternative ‘cooperation’ conception of 
responsibilities. Yet here, it seems, the very existence of a binding obligation is in question. The 
                                                          
25 In a footnote it is also acknowledged that there are disagreements about the “Lotus presumption.” Id. at 1138 n.136. 
26 See, e.g., the discussion and sources cited in Wilde, supra note 4. 
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consequence of all this is that there is a bold affirmation of normativity, where such normativity is 
actually disputed, in relation to unusual situations, and a questioning of normativity, despite the 
existence of binding treaty provisions on the issue, in relation to a much broader area of international 
economic relations. 
In this context, is hard not to view the questioning of the binding nature of the obligation to 
cooperate internationally as overcompensation. It seems that in this area it is deemed prudent to play 
it safe in terms of the extent to which economically privileged states will have to act and international 
economic relations will have to be altered – so safe, actually, that objections to the binding nature of 
express provisions of a treaty will be deferred to. 
It can hardly be a surprise, then, that what follows from this is very limited. The Commentary 
concludes that on the question of the provision of assistance, it is probably only possible to say that 
states should coordinate with each other, including on the allocation of responsibilities, and have 
foreign assistance programs.27 Within this, on the crucial question of how much resources are to be 
allocated to such programs, the Commentary adopts the standard ‘progressive’ approach adopted in 
relation to positive obligations to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights generally, that states have 
to assist to the maximum of their available resources.28 
The progressive test requiring best efforts (“in a position to do so”) to be made in the area of 
fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights is, of course, a challenging idea even if just applied to 
the domestic context (given that, for example, the level of available resources is not fixed, being 
determined, rather, by prior matters involving contested choices between fundamentally different 
economic and political systems). But when it is applied to extraterritorial assistance, it has to reckon 
                                                          
27 Principles, supra note 2, princs. 30, 33. See also id. princs. 28-29, 31-32, 34-35, and the relevant sections of De Schutter 
et al., supra note 2. 
28 Principles, supra note 2, princ. 33. See also, on coordination, id. princ. 30, and on capacity and resources, princ. 32, 
and the relevant sections of De Schutter et al., supra note 2. On the ‘progressive’ standard, see ICESCR, supra note 21, 
art. 2. 
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with a new complicating factor: how are resources to be divided up between welfare ‘at home’ and 
welfare ‘abroad,’ assuming a zero sum equation? This is, of course, a crucial matter that goes to the 
heart of a regime that purports to conceive extraterritorial norms in the area of economic rights. 
There is, actually, an international standard of some pedigree that speaks to the crucial quantum 
question. As the Commentary acknowledges, the aforementioned target of 0.7% of GNP to be 
allocated to overseas development assistance by wealthier countries has been affirmed in a range of 
instruments.29 This is the closest that international law has come to a benchmark for economic 
redistribution through aid, thereby speaking to the crucial issue of where the balance is to be struck 
between welfare at home and welfare extraterritorially.  
However, the Commentary does not address the fundamental matter of whether or not this target 
is, or might become, legally obligatory.30 In their separate writings on the Principles, some of those 
involved in the initiative reference the resistance of wealthier states to the notion that there is a legal 
obligation to cooperate in general, and an obligation to provide particular levels of assistance in 
particular.31 This may be, then, a pragmatic decision made to accept, not challenge, the resistance of 
such states to obligation in this area, in order, presumably, to ensure that they come on board on the 
regime more generally, which, in order for this logic to work, has to be worth the price paid in 
jettisoning some of the core aspects of the obligation to cooperate. But the merits of this position are 
not self-evident, requiring a considered cost-benefit analysis that is reasoned and persuasive. No such 
analysis is being conducted. The fact that this compromise has been made is not even acknowledged, 
let alone justified. Bearing in mind the foregoing analysis, what can be said about the substantive 
                                                          
29 G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, ¶ 43 
(Oct. 24, 1970); Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Financing for Development Fourth Session, 
Revised draft outcome prepared by the Facilitator, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. A/AC.257/32 (Dec. 7, 2001); G.A. Res. 63/239, Doha 
Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome Document of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing 
for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, ¶ 43 (Mar. 19, 2009).  
30 De Schutter et al., supra note 2, at 1152. 
31 See Salomon, supra note 2; Coomans, supra note 2, at 6; Langford et al., supra note 2, at 26. 
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nature of the legal regime on ‘cooperation’ as set out by the Maastricht experts? The very existence 
of an obligation to assist is called into question, and no proper consideration is given to the crucial 
question of how resources are to be allocated by more economically advantaged states as between 
welfare at home and welfare internationally, let alone the matter of whether the 0.7% target of GNP, 
which would in any event be remarkably modest, is or might be binding. More fundamentally, the 
language of ‘assistance’ and ‘cooperation’ indicates very limited notions of action. It suggests a 
preexisting reality taken as a given and, moreover, in relation to which it locates responsibility for 
realizing socioeconomic rights exclusively in the territorial state, as in the quotation from Andrew 
Heard at the start of this section, cited by Langford, Vandenhole, Scheinin and van Genugten,32 with 
its reference to the provision of “help if the government most directly responsible fails to fulfil its 
duties.” Other states then ‘assist’ that government in this, although not by any clear level in terms of 
resources. Broader, more fundamental approaches, including of redistribution, that would involve a 
more radical transformation of the world economy, are not considered.  
This is a model that takes the existing structures of the global economy as a given, grafting onto 
them relatively minor modifications which do not in any significant way challenge things to bring 
about a significant change in levels of poverty and economic inequality across borders. There is no 
place here for the kind of radical restructuring of the world economy that would be of much more 
significance to the global poor, the call for which, of course, is associated with social movements in 
the global South and with certain ideas from postcolonial and Third World approaches to international 
law (TWAIL). 
VII. Conclusion: The Appropriateness of the ETO Framework 
What is the merit of an approach that is grounded in human rights law when it comes to the quest to 
combat global poverty and economic inequality? Will the law make a big difference? If not, and its 
                                                          
32 Langford et al., supra note 2. 
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potential is more limited, should the current legal settlement serve as the departure point, from which 
to go further, making refinements? Is it the right place to start? 
The foregoing analysis suggests, as mentioned, that as far as the view taken on it by the ETO 
initiative is concerned, the current legal regime takes the fundamental structures of global economic 
relations largely as is, grafting onto this relatively discrete areas of liability, concerned either with 
certain forms of power relations and harm understood in terms of direct or foreseeable causation, or 
vague notions of ‘cooperation’ that do not extend to particular levels of financial and resource 
transfer. 
It would seem, then, that if this view of the law were doctrinally correct, some of the grand claims 
made for the potential of international human rights law in the context of global poverty and economic 
inequality, as indicated in the quotation at the start of this chapter, would not stand up to scrutiny. It 
has to be asked, then, whether a campaign to put human rights obligations at the center of activism in 
this field is a valuable use of the limited time and resources of those involved. And, in consequence, 
the concern must also be that the modest nature of the substantive law creates a danger that it will 
merely serve to bolster the continuation of the status quo, which can now be further legitimated by 
states through claims to being ‘human rights compliant.’ 
But could not a more modest position be adopted, that certain limited improvements might be 
effected at the margins, and that more radical efforts seeking transformatory changes can be, and 
indeed perhaps should be, left to broader struggles taking place outside the structures of international 
human rights law? Such broader struggles could, as human rights by definition cannot, involve ideas 
that offer more fundamental challenges to the structural aspects of global economic life, from the 
division of the world into sovereign states itself to the substantive models of economics that form the 
basis for the world economy. Modesty in the expectations made of the law can also be used to limit 
the legitimating power the law holds when it comes to undergirding the status quo: if activists were 
not making grand claims about the value of the law, states would be undermined in their efforts to 
use the law to legitimate business as usual. 
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Part of the problem with this approach is that it substitutes an overblown account of the law’s 
emancipatory potential with an alternative narrative that obscures how the law enables particular 
substantive policies to be furthered. A model of extraterritorial obligations in the economic sphere 
that is limited to narrow conceptions of direct or foreseeable harm, direct territorial control, or vague 
notions of cooperation maps onto a liberal economic model of laissez-faire, with a modicum of light-
touch regulation and modest social provision in exceptional areas, outside unusual situations where 
direct territorial control is exercised by a foreign state. International economic inequality is accepted 
as a given, bar narrow areas where there is more direct transboundary harm (only in the present), and 
the possibility of ‘assistance,’ which is unquantified and thereby left largely in the realm of charity 
and discretion. This model not only lacks more substantial socialist or solidaristic elements; for its 
proponents, of course, it would be conceived to be an alternative to a model with these elements. For 
an economist, international human rights law would appear to have come down on one side in the 
hugely contested debate about the operation of the global economy. 
If this is correct, then it is not possible simply to assume that the ETO approach offers a modest, 
neutral foundation on which all manner of developments, including progressive, transformative, and 
solidaristic ones, might be possible. The foundation might determine that which is possible. It sets 
the trajectory that would, therefore, have to be altered, not followed, if different conceptions of 
international economic relations were to be attempted. More fundamentally, as a project of 
international human rights law, this initiative ends up legitimating the state-based international 
system that might be one of the structural causes of international economic inequality (cf. TWAIL 
critiques). Moreover, on its own terms, this system privileges states in the area of norm-generation 
and transformation. The modest nature of the ETO view of the current regime for extraterritoriality 
could be built upon not only by those who aspire to progressive development; it could also be captured 
by others who have very different priorities. 
 
 
